Interpretations are claims, not preferences
When someone says 'I interpret this passage as meaning X,' they are making a claim — a claim that can be supported by evidence, tested against the text, and shown to be right or wrong. This sounds obvious, but most people do not treat interpretations this way. They treat them as preferences: you like chocolate, I like vanilla; you read the passage one way, I read it another. On this view, there is nothing to argue about. Both readings are equally valid because interpretation is subjective.
This unit rejects that view. Some interpretations are better than others. A reading that is supported by the text's language, consistent with its context, and compatible with the author's purpose is better than a reading that ignores the language, contradicts the context, and imposes a meaning the author never intended. The second reading is not 'equally valid.' It is wrong — or at least, far less defensible.
The difference between a preference and a claim is that a claim can be argued for. You cannot argue someone into liking chocolate. But you can argue that a passage means X by pointing to specific words, contextual clues, genre conventions, and authorial statements that support X. You can also argue against the competing reading Y by showing that it conflicts with the evidence. This is what interpretive argument is: marshaling evidence to support one reading and undermine its rivals.
Treating interpretation as 'just opinion' has a cost. It means there is no way to resolve disagreements about what a text says. If every reading is equally valid, then no one can ever be told they have misunderstood. No one can misread a contract, a law, a philosophical argument, or a policy proposal. The very concept of misinterpretation disappears. And since misinterpretation is the most common source of reasoning error, this is intellectually catastrophic.